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Abstract 
Background: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve 
automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against 
adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the diagnosis. Several previous studies have 
considered simple adversarial attacks. However, the vulnerability of DNNs to more realistic and higher risk attacks, 
such as universal adversarial perturbation (UAP), which is a single perturbation that can induce DNN failure in most 
classification tasks has not been evaluated yet.
Methods: We focus on three representative DNN-based medical image classification tasks (i.e., skin cancer, referable 
diabetic retinopathy, and pneumonia classifications) and investigate their vulnerability to the seven model architec-
tures of UAPs.
Results: We demonstrate that DNNs are vulnerable to both nontargeted UAPs, which cause a task failure resulting 
in an input being assigned an incorrect class, and to targeted UAPs, which cause the DNN to classify an input into a 
specific class. The almost imperceptible UAPs achieved > 80% success rates for nontargeted and targeted attacks. The 
vulnerability to UAPs depended very little on the model architecture. Moreover, we discovered that adversarial retrain-
ing, which is known to be an effective method for adversarial defenses, increased DNNs’ robustness against UAPs in 
only very few cases.
Conclusion: Unlike previous assumptions, the results indicate that DNN-based clinical diagnosis is easier to deceive 
because of adversarial attacks. Adversaries can cause failed diagnoses at lower costs (e.g., without consideration of 
data distribution); moreover, they can affect the diagnosis. The effects of adversarial defenses may not be limited. Our 
findings emphasize that more careful consideration is required in developing DNNs for medical imaging and their 
practical applications.
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Background
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are effective for image 
classification and are beginning to be applied to medi-
cal image diagnosis to empower physicians and accel-
erate decision making in clinical environments [1]. For 
example, DNNs have been used to classify skin cancer 
based on photographic images [2], referable diabetic 
retinopathy based on optical coherence tomography 
(OCT) images of the retina [3], and pneumonia based 
on chest X-ray images [3]. They have demonstrated high 
diagnostic performances. A meta-analysis [4] has indi-
cated that the diagnostic performance of DNNs is equiv-
alent to that of healthcare professionals.
Despite DNNs’ high performance, their practical appli-
cation in disease diagnosis is still debatable. High-stake 
decision making will be based on disease diagnosis. 
Complex classifiers, including DNNs, can potentially 
cause catastrophic harm to society because they are often 
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difficult to interpret [5]. More importantly, DNNs present 
a number of security concerns [6]. Specifically, DNNs 
are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [7, 
8], which are input images that cause misclassifications 
by DNNs and are typically generated by adding specific, 
imperceptible perturbations to original input images that 
have been correctly classified using DNNs. The existence 
of adversarial examples raises questions about DNNs’ 
generalization ability, reduces model interpretability, and 
limits deep learning applications in safety- and security-
critical environments [9]. In particular, adversarial exam-
ples cause not only misdiagnosis but also various social 
disturbances [10]. The vulnerability of DNNs to adversar-
ial attacks has been claimed in skin cancer [10] and pneu-
monia classifications based on chest X-ray images [11].
Nevertheless, more focused investigations are needed 
on DNNs’ vulnerability to adversarial attacks. Previous 
studies have only considered input-dependent adversarial 
attacks (i.e., an individual adversarial perturbation is used 
such that each input image is misclassified). Such adver-
sarial attacks are difficult because they require high com-
putational costs. More realistic adversarial attacks must 
be further considered. Notably, a single small, image 
agnostic perturbation, called universal adversarial per-
turbation (UAP), that can induce DNN failure in most 
image classification tasks, has been reported [12]. A pre-
vious study [12] considered only UAPs for nontargeted 
attacks, which cause misclassification (i.e., a task failure 
resulting in an input image being assigned an incorrect 
class). However, we previously extended the UAPs gen-
erating algorithm to enable targeted attacks [13], which 
caused the DNN to classify an input image into a specific 
class. UAPs are difficult to detect because such perturba-
tions are extremely small and, hence, do not significantly 
affect data distributions. UAP-based adversarial attacks 
can be more straightforward to implement by adversar-
ies in real-world environments. UAPs are vulnerable to 
security threats in medical image diagnosis; however, 
UAP vulnerability is still poorly evaluated in DNN-
based medical image diagnosis to date. Specifically, many 
researchers and engineers have simply developed DNNs 
using transfer learning (by fine-tuning pretrained DNN 
models with medical images), inspired by famous studies 
on medical image classification based on DNNs [2, 3] and 
have applied DNNs to medical image classification with-
out consideration for their vulnerability to UAPs. Addi-
tionally, defense strategies against UAPs in DNN-based 
medical image classification are still poorly investigated, 
although the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial attacks 
indicates the need for strategies to address security con-
cerns (i.e., adversarial defense [8]). Specifically, adversar-
ial retraining is one of the few approaches that could not 
be defeated thus far [14].
This study aims to evaluate the vulnerability of DNNs 
to UAPs for medical image classification and to warn 
against facile applications of DNNs for medical image 
classification. We focused on representative medical 
image classifications: skin cancer classification based on 
photographic images [2], referable diabetic retinopathy 
classification based on OCT images [3], and pneumo-
nia classification based on chest X-ray images [3]. We 
obtained DNN models with various architectures for 
medical image diagnosis inspired by previous studies [2, 
3] and investigated their vulnerability to nontargeted and 
targeted attacks based on UAPs. Moreover, adversarial 
defense was considered; in particular, we evaluated the 
increased robustness of DNNs to nontargeted and tar-
geted UAPs using adversarial retraining [12, 14–16], a 
representative method for adversarial defenses.
Methods
Medical image datasets
We used three types of medical images: skin lesion 
images for skin cancer classification, OCT images for ref-
erable diabetic retinopathy classification, and chest X-ray 
images for pneumonia classification.
In a previous study [2], skin lesion images (red–
green–blue color) were obtained from the International 
Skin Imaging Collaboration (ISIC) 2018 dataset (chal-
lenge2018.isic-archive.com/task3/training/), in which 
the images were classified into seven classes: melanoma 
(MEL), melanocytic nevus (NV), basal cell carcinoma 
(BCC), actinic keratosis/Bowens disease (intraepithe-
lial carcinoma; AKIEC), benign keratosis (solar lentigo/
seborrheic keratosis/lichen planus-like keratosis; BKL), 
dermatofibroma (DF), and vascular lesions (VASC). The 
dataset comprised 10,015 images. We randomly divided 
these images into 7,000 training images (778 MEL, 4,689 
NV, 370 BCC, 229 AKIEC, 764 BKL, 76 DF, and 94 VASC 
images, respectively) and 3,015 test images (335 MEL, 
2016 NV, 144 BCC, 98 AKIEC, 335 BKL, 39 DF, and 48 
VASC images, respectively).
The OCT and chest X-ray images (grayscale) were 
obtained from a previous study [3] (data.mendeley.
com/datasets/rscbjbr9sj/3). The OCT images were clas-
sified into four classes: choroidal neovascularization 
with neovascular membrane and associated subreti-
nal fluid (CNV), diabetic macular edema with retinal-
thickening-associated intraretinal fluid (DME), multiple 
drusen present in early age-related macular degeneration 
(DRUSEN), and normal retina with preserved foveal con-
tour and absence of any retinal fluid/edema (NM). The 
original dataset comprised 37,455 CNV, 11,598 DME, 
8866 DRUSEN, and 51,390 NM images, respectively. We 
constructed a class-balanced training image set and test 
image set by randomly selecting 1960 and 840 images 
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per class, without duplicates, respectively. We finally 
obtained 7840 training and 3360 test images.
The chest X-ray images were classified into binary 
classes: no pneumonia (NORMAL) or viral or bacterial 
pneumonia (PNEUMONIA). The original dataset com-
prised 1583 NORMAL and 4273 PNEUMONIA images. 
We constructed a class-balanced training image set and 
test image set by randomly selecting 900 and 270 images 
per class, without duplicates, respectively. We finally 
obtained 1800 training and 540 test images.
Transfer learning methods
Following previous studies [2, 3], we obtained the DNN 
models using transfer learning; in particular, we fine-
tuned DNN models pretrained using the ImageNet 
dataset [17] with a medical image dataset. We mainly 
considered the Inception V3 architecture [18], following 
previous studies. To investigate the effect of model archi-
tecture on adversarial robustness, we considered different 
model architectures: VGG16 [19], VGG19 [19], ResNet50 
[20], Inception ResNet V2 [21], DenseNet 121 [22], and 
DenseNet 169 [22]. For each model architecture, we 
replaced the original last fully connected (FC) layer with 
a new FC layer in which the output size is the number 
of classes. The images were resized to 299 × 299 pixels. 
All layer parameters were fine-tuned using the training 
images in a medical image dataset. We used the stochas-
tic gradient descent optimizer with a momentum of 0.9. 
The batch size and number of epochs were set to 32 and 
50, respectively. The learning rates were scheduled based 
on the number of epochs: 0.001 for ≤ 40 epochs, 1e−4 
for 41–45 epochs, and 1e−5 for > 45 epochs. To avoid 
overfitting, data augmentation was considered: random 
image rotations with angles ranging between − 5° and 5° 
and random 5% height and width image shifts. For the 
skin cancer classification, we adopted oversampling to 
account for imbalances in the dataset. The transfer learn-
ing procedures were performed using Keras (version 
2.2.4; Keras.io).
Universal adversarial perturbations
Simple iterative algorithms [12, 13] were used to gen-
erate UAPs for nontargeted and targeted attacks. The 
algorithms’ details are described in [12, 13]. We used 
the nontargeted UAP algorithm available in the Adver-
sarial Robustness 360 Toolbox (ART) [23] (version 1.0; 
github.com/Trusted-AI/adversarial-robustness-tool-
box). The targeted UAP algorithm was implemented 
by modifying the nontargeted UAP algorithm from our 
previous study in ART [13] (github.com/hkthirano/
targeted_UAP_CIFAR10).
The algorithms consider a classifier and generate non-
targeted (targeted) UPAs ρ from an input image set X , 
under the constraint that the Lp norm of the perturba-




∥ ≤ ξ ). 
The algorithms start with ρ = 0 (no perturbation) and 
iteratively update ρ by additively obtaining an adversar-
ial perturbation for an input image x , which is randomly 
selected from X without replacement. These iterative 
updates continue until the number of iterations reaches 
a maximum imax.
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [7] is used to 
obtain an adversarial perturbation for the input image. 
Meanwhile, the original UAP algorithm [12] uses the 
DeepFool method [24]. This is because the FGSM is used 
for both nontargeted and targeted attacks, and DeepFool 
requires a higher computational cost than the FGSM and 
only generates a nontargeted adversarial example for the 
input image. The FGSM generates the adversarial pertur-
bation for x based on the loss gradient [7] with the attack 
strength parameter ǫ.
Nontargeted and targeted UAPs were generated using 
the training images in the dataset. The parameter ǫ was 
set to 0.0024; cases where p = 2 and ∞ were consid-
ered. The parameter ξ was determined based on the ratio 
ζ of the Lp norm of the UAP to the average Lp norm of 
an image in the dataset. For the ISIC 2018 (skin lesion 
image) dataset, the average L∞ and L2 norms were 237 
and 85,662, respectively. For the OCT image dataset, the 
average L∞ and L2 norms were 253 and 15,077, respec-
tively. For the chest X-ray image dataset, the average L∞ 
and L2 norms were 253 and 40,738, respectively. The 
parameter imax was set to 15.
To compare the performances of the generated UAPs 
with those of the random controls, we generated ran-
dom vectors (random UAPs) sampled uniformly from the 
sphere of a specified radius [12].
Vulnerability evaluation
The fooling rate Rf  and targeted attack success rate Rs 
were computed to evaluate the vulnerability of the DNN 
models to a nontargeted UAP ( ρnt ) and targeted UAP 
( ρt ), respectively. Further, Rf  for an image set X is defined 
as adversarial images for which predicted labels are 
inconsistent with the labels predicted from their associ-
ated clean images to all images in the set (i.e., the proba-
bility that the labels predicted from clean images are 
inconsistent with the labels predicted from their adver-
sarial images). Let C(x) be an output (class or label) of a 
classifier (DNN) for an input image x , 










 , where the func-
tion I(A) returns 1 if the condition A is true and 0 other-
wise. Rs for an image set is the proportion of adversarial 
images classified into the target class y to all images in 











 . It is noteworthy 
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that Rs has a baseline, defined as Rs , observed without 
UAPs. Class (label) composition of image data and pre-
diction performance of DNNs both affect the baseline. In 
this study, for the OCT and chest X-ray image datasets, 
the Rs baselines of UAPs targeted to a specified class 
were ~ 25% and ~ 50%, respectively. For the skin lesion 
dataset, the Rs baselines of UAPs targeted to MEL and 
NV were ~ 10% and ~ 65%, respectively.
Additionally, we obtained the confusion matrices, to 
evaluate the change in prediction owing to the UAPs for 
each class. The rows and columns in the matrices rep-
resent true and predicted classes, respectively. The con-
fusion matrices were row-normalized to account for an 
imbalanced dataset (ISIC 2018 dataset); in particular, 
each cell value was normalized by the number of obser-
vations with the same true class (label).
Adversarial retraining
Adversarial retraining was performed to increase the 
robustness of the DNN models to UAPs [12, 15]; in par-
ticular, the models were fine-tuned with adversarial 
images. The procedure was described in a previous study 
[12]. A schematic diagram of the adversarial retraining 
procedure is shown in Additional file  1: Fig. S1. A brief 
description is provided here: (1) 10 UAPs against a DNN 
model were generated with the (clean) training image set; 
(2) a modified training image set was obtained by ran-
domly selecting half of the training images and combin-
ing them with the remaining images in which each image 
was perturbed by a UAP randomly selected from the 10 
UAPs; (3) the model was fine-tuned by performing five 
additional epochs of training on the modified training 
image set; (4) a new UAP was generated against the fine-
tuned model using the algorithm with the training image 
set; (5) the UAP Rf  and Rs values for the test images were 
computed; and steps (1)–(5) were repeated five times.
Results
Medical images classification performance
We evaluated the prediction performance of seven DNN 
models for three medical image datasets. The test and 
training accuracies of the models for the datasets are 
summarized in Additional file  1: Table  S1. The DNN 
models achieved good accuracy. For the skin lesion, 
OCT, and chest X-ray image datasets, the average test 
accuracies across the seven models were 87.3%, 95.8%, 
and 98.4%, respectively. Specifically, the test accuracies 
of Inception V3 models, which were frequently used in 
previous studies on medical image diagnosis (e.g., [2, 3]), 
were 87.7%, 95.5%, and 97.6%, respectively. The normal-
ized confusion matrices for the Inception V3 models on 
the test images are shown in Additional file 1: Fig. S2.
Nontargeted universal adversarial attacks
We evaluated the vulnerability of the DNN models to 
nontargeted UAPs. We first considered Inception V3 
models because well-known previous studies on DNN-
based medical image classification used the Inception 
V3 architecture [2, 3]. Figure  1 shows the case of non-
targeted UAPs p = 2 against the Inception V3 models. 
The fooling rates Rf  for both the training and test images 
increased rapidly with the perturbation magnitude ζ and 
reached a high Rf  , despite a low ζ . The UAPs with ζ = 4% 
achieved Rf  > 80% for the skin lesion (Fig. 1a) and chest 
X-ray image datasets (Fig.  1c), whereas slightly larger 
UAPs (with ζ = 6% ) were required to achieve Rf  ~ 70% 
for the OCT image dataset (Fig.  1b). Further, Rf  of the 
nontargeted UAPs was significantly higher than that of 
random UAPs. The confusion matrices on test images 
show that the models classified most images into several 
specific classes (i.e., dominant classes) due to the UAPs 
for the skin lesion and OCT image datasets. Specifically, 
most skin lesion images tended to be classified as AKIEC 
or DF (Fig. 1d); moreover, most OCT images were classi-
fied as CNV (Fig. 1e). For the chest X-ray image dataset, 
the model incorrectly predicted the true labels (Fig. 1f ). 
A high Rf  at low ζ and dominant labels was observed in 
the case of UAP with p = ∞ against the Inception V3 
models for all medical image datasets (Additional file 1: 
Fig. S3). However, the skin lesion images tended to be 
classified into broader classes: BCC, AKIEC, BKL, or DF 
(Additional file 1: Fig. S3D).
We also considered other models to evaluate whether 
the vulnerability to nontargeted UAPs depends on model 
architectures. Table 1 shows Rf  of the UAPs against the 
DNN models for the test images in the medical image 
datasets. Overall, a vulnerability to nontargeted UAPs 
was observed independent of model architectures; in 
particular, the small UAPs ( ζ = 4% for the skin lesions 
and chest X-ray image datasets, and ζ = 6% for the OCT 
image dataset) achieved a high Rf  (70–90%). The UAPs’ 
Rf  were significantly higher than those of the random 
UAPs. However, Rf  partially depends on model archi-
tectures; specifically, Rf  of the UAPs against the VGG16 
and VGG19 models were ~ 50% for the chest X-ray 
image dataset, whereas those of the UAPs against the 
other models were between 70 and 80%. This indicates 
that the models classified images into either NORMAL 
or PNEUMONIA. In the case of UAPs with p = 2 , the 
VGG16 and VGG19 models classified most test images 
into PNEUMONIA and NORMAL, respectively (Addi-
tional file  1: Fig. S4). In the case of UAPs with p = ∞ , 
both the VGG16 and VGG19 models predicted most of 
the test images as NORMAL. This indicates that the con-
fusion matrix patterns (dominant classes) might change 
according to the model architecture and p . Additionally, 
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a change in confusion matrix patterns (on test images) 
was observed in the skin lesions and OCT image data-
sets. For example, the VGG16 model classified most skin 
lesion images into BKL owing to the UAP with ζ = 4% 
and p = 2 (Additional file  1: Figure S5A), whereas the 
Inception V3 models classified them into AKIEC or DF 
(Fig.  1d). The ResNet 50 model classified most OCT 
images into DME owing to the UAP with ζ = 6% and 
p = 2 (Additional file 1: Fig. S5B), whereas Inception V3 
models classified them into CNV (Fig. 1e).
We investigated whether the nontargeted UAPs were 
perceptible. As a representative example, the nontargeted 
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Fig. 1 Vulnerability to nontargeted UAPs with p = 2 . Line plots of the fooling rate Rf  against Inception V3 model versus perturbation magnitude 
ζ for skin lesions (a), OCT (b), and chest X-ray (c) image datasets. Legend label indicates image set used for computing Rf  . Additional argument 
“(random)” indicates that random UAPs were used instead of UAPs. Normalized confusion matrices for Inception V3 models attacked using UAPs on 
test images of skin lesions (d), OCT (e), and chest X-ray (f) image datasets are also shown. ζ = 4% in d and f. ζ = 6% in e 
Table 1 Fooling rates Rf  (%) of  nontargeted UAPs against  various DNN models for  test images of  skin lesions, OCT, 
and chest X-ray image datasets
ζ = 4% for the skin lesions and chest X-ray image datasets. ζ = 6% for the OCT image dataset. Values in brackets are Rf  of random UAPs (random controls)
Model architecture Skin lesions OCT Chest X-ray
p = 2 p = ∞ p = 2 p = ∞ p = 2 p = ∞
Inception V3 92.2 (14.1) 90.0 (11.8) 70.2 (1.0) 73.9 (3.4) 81.7 (2.4) 79.8 (3.0)
VGG16 87.6 (4.9) 86.4 (3.5) 72.4 (0.2) 74.9 (1.8) 49.8 (2.2) 50.0 (2.2)
VGG19 89.2 (5.2) 87.0 (3.7) 72.8 (0.4) 74.7 (2.1) 49.3 (3.9) 49.3 (4.4)
ResNet50 91.9 (11.6) 87.9 (10.1) 71.2 (1.1) 74.8 (5.4) 72.6 (7.2) 73.0 (7.4)
Inception ResNet V2 94.5 (16.7) 90.3 (15.2) 69.6 (1.4) 74.0 (3.2) 78.0 (2.6) 77.0 (3.3)
DenseNet 121 93.8 (12.0) 82.9 (10.2) 68.8 (1.3) 73.0 (3.6) 69.8 (3.9) 71.7 (4.1)
DenseNet 169 93.8 (11.7) 84.2 (9.1) 50.3 (1.3) 72.3 (4.0) 67.6 (2.8) 71.3 (3.7)
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UAPs with p = 2 against the Inception V3 models and 
examples of adversarial images for the medical image 
datasets are shown in Fig. 2. The UAPs with ζ = 4% for 
the skin lesions and chest X-ray image datasets and with 
ζ = 6% for the OCT image dataset were almost imper-
ceptible. The models predicted the original images as 
their actual classes; however, they classified the adversar-
ial images into incorrect classes owing to the nontargeted 
UAPs. The UAPs with p = ∞ and those against the other 
DNN models were also almost imperceptible for the skin 
lesion (Additional file 1: Fig. S6), OCT (Additional file 1: 
Fig. S7), and chest X-ray image datasets (Additional file 1: 
Fig. S8).
Moreover, we found that different UAP patterns were 
observed in the different model architectures for each 
medical image dataset (Additional file 1: Figs. S6–S8). We 
hypothesized that the UAPs have no transferability, which 
indicates that UAPs generated based on DNNs with one 
model architecture can be used to deceive DNNs with 
another model architecture and to evaluate the trans-
ferability of UAPs. As expected, transferability was not 
confirmed for the OCT (Additional file 1: Table S3) and 
chest X-ray image datasets (Additional file  1: Table  S4); 
however, a weak transferability of UAPs was observed 
in the skin lesions image dataset (Additional file  1: 
Table S5). Specifically, the nontargeted UAPs with p = 2 
generated based on the Inception V3 models achieved 
Rf  of approximately 45%, ~ 2%, and ~ 10% on average 
against the DNNs with another model architecture for 
the skin lesions, OCT, and chest X-ray image datasets, 
respectively.
Targeted universal adversarial attacks
We have developed targeted UAPs in our previous study 
[13]. We evaluated whether the DNNs are vulnerable 
not only to nontargeted UAPs but also to targeted UAPs 
(i.e., whether UAPs can control DNN outputs). Table  2 
shows the targeted attack success rates Rs of the UAPs 
with p = 2 against the DNN models for the test images in 
the medical image datasets. As representative examples, 
we considered targeted attacks to be the most significant 
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Fig. 2 Nontargeted UAPs with p = 2 against Inception V3 models and their adversarial images for skin lesions (a), OCT (b), and chest X-ray image 
datasets (c). Further, ζ = 4% in a and c. ζ = 6% in b. Labels in brackets beside the images are the predicted classes. The original (clean) images 
are correctly classified into their actual labels. UAPs are emphatically displayed for clarity; in particular, each UAP is scaled by a maximum of 1 and 
minimum of 0
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skin lesion image datasets, targeted attacks on MEL and 
NV were considered. For the OCT image dataset, tar-
geted attacks on CNV and NM were considered. For the 
chest X-ray image dataset, targeted attacks on PNEU-
MONIA and NORMAL were considered. Overall, a high 
(> 85%) Rs was observed regardless of the model architec-
ture, despite small UAPs (with ζ = 2% for the skin lesions 
and chest X-ray image datasets, and ζ = 6% for the OCT 
image dataset). Furthermore, the confusion matrices 
(Fig.  3) indicate that the UAP-based targeted attacks 
were successful: most ( Rs% of ) test images were classi-
fied into the targeted class owing to the UAPs (Table 2). 
However, a smaller Rs was partially observed according to 
the model architectures and datasets. For the skin lesions 
image dataset, Rs of the UAPs against VGG16 (~ 40%) and 
VGG19 (~ 65%) models were lower than those (~ 90%) 
of the UAPs against the other models. For the targeted 
attacks on NM in the OCT image dataset, Rs (30–40%) 
of the UAPs against the VGG and DensNet models were 
lower than those (~ 85%) of the UAPs against the other 
models. Further, Rs of random UAPs was almost equiva-
lent to those of the baselines. The Rs values of the UAPs 
were significantly higher than those of the random UAPs. 
Furthermore, a high Rs for a small ζ was observed for the 
targeted UAPs with p = ∞ (Additional file 1: Table S2). 
However, Rs for targeted attacks on MEL was lower over-
all than Rs of the UAPs with p = 2 . For example, Rs of the 
UAPs with p = 2 and p = ∞ against the Inception V3 
model were ~ 95% and ~ 75%, respectively.
We investigated whether the targeted UAPs were 
perceptible. As a representative example, the targeted 
UAPs with p = 2 against the Inception V3 models and 
examples of adversarial images for the medical image 
datasets are shown in Fig.  4. The targeted UAPs with 
ζ = 2% for the skin lesions and chest X-ray image data-
sets and ζ = 6% for the OCT image dataset were also 
almost imperceptible. The models predicted the original 
images as their actual classes; however, they classified the 
adversarial images into the targeted class owing to the 
UAPs. The UAPs with p = ∞ and those against the other 
DNN models were also almost imperceptible. For the 
skin lesion image dataset, Additional file 1: Figures S9 and 
S10 show the targeted attacks on NV and MEL, respec-
tively. For the OCT image dataset, Additional file 1: Fig-
ures S11 and S12 show the targeted attacks on NM and 
CNV, respectively. For the chest X-ray image dataset, 
Additional file 1: Figures S13 and S14 show the targeted 
attacks on NORMAL and PNEUMONIA, respectively.
We also evaluated whether UAP patterns depend on 
model architectures and found that they did so for each 
medical image dataset (Additional file  1: Figs. S9–S14). 
The non-transferability of UAPs was also confirmed for 
the skin lesions (Additional file 1: Table S6), OCT (Addi-
tional file  1: Table  S7), and chest X-ray image datasets 
(Additional file  1: Table  S8); specifically, Rs observed 
when the targeted UAPs with p = 2 generated based 
on the Inception V3 model that attacked the DNN 
models with another architecture were almost equiva-
lent to their baselines of Rs ~ 10%, ~ 25%, and ~ 50% for 
the skin lesions, OCT, and chest X-ray image datasets, 
respectively.
Adversarial retraining
We analyzed the usefulness of adversarial retraining 
against universal adversarial attacks (both nontargeted 
and targeted UAPs). We considered Inception V3 mod-
els because well-known previous studies on DNN-based 
medical image classification used the Inception V3 archi-
tecture [2, 3].
Figure  5 shows the effect of adversarial retraining on 
Rf  of nontargeted UAPs with p = 2 against Inception V3 
models for the skin lesions, OCT, and chest X-ray image 
datasets, ζ = 4% for the skin lesions and chest X-ray 
image datasets, and ζ = 6% for the OCT image dataset. 
Adversarial retraining did not affect test accuracy. For the 
OCT image dataset, Rf  decreased with the adversarial 
Table 2 Targeted attack success rates Rs (%) of targeted UAPs with p = 2 against various DNN models to each target class




Skin lesions OCT Chest X-ray
NV MEL NM CNV NORMAL PNEUMONIA
Inception V3 93.3 (65.6) 94.4 (12.2) 84.1 (25.7) 95.9 (24.8) 96.1 (52.8) 93.3 (47.2)
VGG16 89.6 (71.7) 40.4 (8.3) 32.4 (25.4) 97.7 (24.9) 95.6 (50.2) 95.0 (49.8)
VGG19 91.6 (72.1) 64.6 (8.7) 41.2 (25.9) 97.5 (24.9) 97.6 (51.7) 95.2 (48.3)
ResNet50 97.9 (66.5) 92.4 (11.8) 84.9 (25.8) 98.5 (24.5) 95.7 (53.5) 95.2 (46.5)
Inception ResNet V2 92.4 (61.0) 97.3 (16.1) 84.5 (25.6) 96.2 (24.7) 98.3 (53.1) 93.9 (46.9)
DenseNet 121 92.1 (65.2) 90.5 (13.4) 41.8 (25.3) 88.1 (24.7) 94.8 (51.9) 92.0 (48.1)
DenseNet 169 92.9 (65.8) 92.9 (12.2) 41.7 (25.0) 92.7 (24.2) 95.7 (52.0) 93.1 (48.0)
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retraining iterations; specifically, Rf  decreased from 70.2 
to 13.1% after five iterations (Fig. 5b); however, ~ 40% of 
the NM images were still classified into an incorrect class 
(DME, Fig.  5e). The adversarial retraining effect on Rf  
was limited for the skin lesions (Fig. 5a) and chest X-ray 
image datasets (Fig. 5b). For the chest X-ray image data-
set, Rf  decreased from 81.7 to 46.7%. A Rf  of ~ 50% indi-
cates that the model classified most images into either 
one of two classes; specifically, most images were classi-
fied into NORMAL at the fifth iteration (Fig. 5f ). For the 
skin lesions image dataset, no remarkable decrease in Rf  
due to adversarial retraining was confirmed; specifically, 
Rf  decreased from 92.2 to 82.1% (Fig.  5a). Most images 
were classified into MEL at the fifth iteration (Fig.  5c). 
However, the dominant classes changed for each itera-
tion. For example, the dominant classes were AKIEC and 
BKL at the third and fourth iterations, respectively (Fig. 
S15 in Additional file 1).
Figure 6 shows the effect of adversarial retraining on the 
Rs of targeted UAPs with p = 2 against the Inception V3 
models for the skin lesions, OCT, and chest X-ray image 
datasets. As representative examples, we considered tar-
geted attacks on the most significant cases, namely, MEL, 
CNV, and PNEUMONIA for the skin lesions, OCT, and 
chest X-ray image datasets, respectively; ζ = 2% for the 
skin lesions and chest X-ray image datasets; and ζ = 6% 
for the OCT image dataset. Adversarial retraining did 
not affect the test accuracy and reduced Rs for all medical 
image datasets (Fig. 6a–c). For the OCT and chest X-ray 
image dataset, Rs decreased from ~ 95% to the baseline Rs 
(~ 25% and ~ 50%, respectively) after five iterations. For 
the skin lesions image dataset, Rs decreased from ~ 95 
to ~ 30%; however, Rs at the fifth iteration was higher than 
the baseline (~ 10%). The confusion matrices (Fig. 6d–f) 
indicated that adversarial retraining was useful against 
UAP-based targeted attacks: most images were correctly 
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Fig. 3 Normalized confusion matrices for Inception V3 models attacked with targeted UPAs with p = 2 on test images in skin lesions (left panels), 
OCT (middle panels), and chest X-ray image datasets (right panels). Further, ζ = 2% for skin lesions and chest X-ray image datasets, and ζ = 6% for 
OCT image dataset
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classified into the original classes despite the adversarial 
attacks. However, the effect of adversarial retraining was 
partially limited for the skin lesions image dataset. For 
example, 30% of the NV images were still classified into 
the target class (MEL) despite five iterations of adver-
sarial retraining (Fig. 6c). Furthermore, ~ 20% of the BKL 
and VASC images were still classified into the target 
class.
Discussion
We showed the vulnerability of the DNN models for 
medical image classification to small UAPs. Previous 
studies [10, 11] have indicated the vulnerability to adver-
sarial attacks toward medical DNNs; however, they were 
limited to input image-dependent perturbations. In this 
study, we demonstrated that almost imperceptible UAPs 
caused DNN misclassifications. Unlike previous assump-
tions, these results indicate that a DNN-based medi-
cal image diagnosis is easier to deceive. Adversaries can 
result in failed DNN-based medical image diagnoses at 
lower costs (i.e., using a single perturbation). Specifically, 
they do not need to consider the distribution and diver-
sity of input images when attacking DNNs using UAPs, as 
UPAs are image agnostic.
We demonstrated that nontargeted attacks based 
on UAPs were possible (Figs.  1 and 2, Table  1). Most 
images were classified into a few specific classes for 
the skin lesions and OCT image (multiclass) datasets. 
This result is consistent with the existence of domi-
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Fig. 4 Targeted UAPs with p = 2 against Inception V3 models and their adversarial images for skin lesions (a), OCT (b), and chest X-ray image 
datasets. Further, ζ = 2% in a and c. ζ = 6% in b. Labels in brackets beside the images are predicted classes. Original (clean) images were correctly 
classified into their actual labels. Adversarial images were classified into the target classes. UAPs are emphatically displayed for clarity; in particular, 
each UAP is scaled by a maximum of 1 and minimum of 0
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For the skin lesions image dataset, the AKIEC and DF 
dominant classes observed in this study may be owing 
to the imbalanced dataset. The number of AKIEC and 
DF images is relatively lower than that of the other class 
images. As the algorithm considers maximizing Rf  , a 
relatively large Rf  is achieved when all inputs are clas-
sified into AKIEC and DF owing to UAPs. The use of 
imbalanced datasets may be one of the causes of vul-
nerability to UAPs. To avoid this problem, domain 
adaptation [25, 26] may be useful. For the OCT image 
(binary-class) dataset, the DNN models wrongly pre-
dicted the actual labels because of Rf  maximization; 
however, the existence of dominant classes was par-
tially confirmed according to the model architecture. 
These misclassifications result in false positives and 
false negatives in medical diagnosis. False positives 
may cause unwanted mental stress to patients, whereas 
false negatives may result in significant misdiagnoses 
involving human lives; specifically, they fail to perform 
early detection and render therapeutic strategies dif-
ficult. Moreover, they can cause the social credibility 
of medical doctors and medical organizations to be 
undermined.
The transferability of nontargeted UAPs across model 
architectures was limited (Additional file  1: Tables S3–
S5). This indicates that UAPs are architecture-specific, 
which is inconsistent with a previous study [12]. This 
discrepancy might be due to differences in the image 
datasets. Specifically, the number of classes (2–7) in 
the medical image datasets was lower than that (1000) 
of the dataset used in the previous study. This study 
partly considered grayscale images, whereas the previ-
ous study used colored images only. Transferability may 
be observed in datasets comprising colored images with 
more classes. In fact, a weak transferability was observed 
for the skin lesions image dataset (Additional file  1: 
Table S5).
Furthermore, we showed that targeted attacks based on 
UAPs were possible in medical image diagnosis (Figs.  3 
and 4, Table  2), although the UAPs were not trans-
ferable across model architectures (Additional file  1: 
Tables S6–S8). The results imply that adversaries can 
yar-XtsehCTCOnoiselnikS
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Fig. 5 Effect of adversarial retraining on robustness of nontargeted UAPs with p = 2 against Inception V3 models for skin lesions, OCT, and chest 
X-ray image datasets. ζ = 4% for the skin lesions and chest X-ray image datasets. ζ = 6% for OCT image dataset. The top panels indicate the scatter 
plots of fooling rate Rf  (%) of UAPs versus number of iterations for adversarial retraining. Bottom panels indicate normalized confusion matrices for 
fine-tuned models obtained after five iterations of adversarial retraining. These confusion matrices are on adversarial test images
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control DNN-based medical image diagnoses. As tar-
geted attacks are more realistic, they may result in more 
significant security concerns compared with nontargeted 
attacks. In particular, adversaries can obtain any diag-
nosis; specifically, they can intentionally cause not only 
problems resulting from misdiagnosis, but also various 
social disturbances. As mentioned in a previous study 
[10], adversarial attacks can be used for insurance fraud, 
as well as drug and device approval adjustments, thereby 
fraudulently providing and obtaining high-quality care 
when DNNs are used for decision making.
We considered adversarial retraining, which is known 
to be an effective method for adversarial defenses [14], to 
reduce the vulnerability to UAPs. However, the effect of 
adversarial retraining was limited for nontargeted UAPs 
(Fig.  5). For targeted attacks, adversarial retraining sig-
nificantly reduced the vulnerability to UAPs, but did 
not completely avoid it (particularly for the skin lesions 
image dataset, Fig.  6). Additionally, adversarial retrain-
ing requires high computational costs, as it is an iterative 
fine-tuning method. Simpler alternative methods, such 
as dimensionality reduction (e.g., principle component 
analysis), distributional detection (e.g., maximum mean 
discrepancy), and normalization detection (e.g., dropout 
randomization) are available; however, they are known to 
be easily detected as adversarial examples [15]. Despite 
the recent development in adversarial defenses, such as 
regularized surrogate loss optimization [27], the use of 
a discontinuous activation function [28], and improving 
the generalization of adversarial training with domain 
adaptation [29], many promising defense methods have 
failed [30]. Defending against adversarial attacks is a cat-
and-mouse game [10]. Furthermore, properties inher-
ent to image processing may cause misclassification. For 
instance, DNN-based image reconstructions are often 
performed to purify adversarial examples [31]; however, 
they cause image artifacts, resulting in misclassifications 
by DNNs [32]. It may be difficult to completely avoid 
security concerns caused by adversarial attacks.
The vulnerability to UAPs was confirmed in various 
model architectures. Vulnerability to UAPs may be a uni-
versal feature in DNNs. However, VGG16 and VGG19 
were relatively robust against UAPs compared to the 
other model architectures. This result is consistent with 
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Fig. 6 Effect of adversarial retraining on robustness of targeted UAPs with p = 2 against Inception V3 models for skin lesions, OCT, and chest X-ray 
image dataset. ζ = 2% for skin lesion and chest X-ray image datasets. ζ = 6% for OCT image dataset. Top panels indicate scatter plots of targeted 
attack success rate Rs (%) of UAPs versus number of iterations for adversarial retraining. Bottom panels indicate normalized confusion matrices for 
fine-tuned models obtained after five iterations of adversarial retraining. These confusion matrices are on adversarial test images
Page 12 of 13Hirano et al. BMC Med Imaging            (2021) 21:9 
the fact that shallower neural networks are more robust 
against adversarial attacks for the same task [33]. The use 
of these model architectures may be a simple solution for 
avoiding vulnerability to UAPs. However, such a solution 
may be unrealistic. The effect of the use of these model 
architectures on the decrease in Rf  and Rs was limited 
(Tables  1 and 2). Simpler models may show a relatively 
low prediction performance. Given the tradeoffs between 
prediction performance and robustness against adversar-
ial attacks [27], it may be difficult to develop DNNs with 
both high prediction performance and high robustness 
against UAPs.
Another simple solution for avoiding adversarial 
attacks is to render DNNs closed source and publicly 
unavailable; however, this hinders the accelerated devel-
opment of medical DNNs and practical applications 
of DNNs to automated support for clinical diagnosis. 
Because the amount of medical image data is limited, 
collaboration among multiple institutions is required to 
achieve high diagnostic performance [34]. For similar 
reasons, medical DNNs are often developed by fine-tun-
ing existing DNNs, such as VGG, ResNet, and Inception, 
pretrained using the ImageNet dataset (i.e., via transfer 
learning), although a previous study [34] debated the 
effect of transfer learning on the improvement in pre-
diction performance for medical imaging; consequently, 
model architectures and model weights may be impor-
tant. Furthermore, DNNs are aimed at real-world usage 
(e.g., automated support for clinical diagnosis). The 
assumption that DNNs are a closed source and publicly 
unavailable may be unrealistic. Even if DNNs are black-
box (e.g., model architectures and weights are unknown 
and loss gradient is not accessible), adversarial attacks on 
DNNs may be possible. Several methods for adversarial 
attacks on black-box DNNs, which estimate adversarial 
perturbations using only model outputs (e.g., confidence 
scores), have been proposed [35–37]. The development 
and operation of secure, privacy-preserving, and feder-
ated DNNs are required in medical imaging [6].
Conclusion
Our study is the first to show the vulnerability of DNN-
based medical image classification to both nontargeted 
and targeted UAPs. Our findings emphasize that careful 
consideration is required in the development of DNNs 
for medical imaging and their practical applications. 
Inspired by the high prediction performance of DNNs, 
many studies have applied DNNs to medical image clas-
sification; however, they have ignored the vulnerability 
of UAPs. Our study highlights such facile applications of 
DNNs. Our findings enhance our understanding of the 
vulnerabilities of DNNs to adversarial attacks and may 
help increase the security of DNNs. UAPs are useful for 
reliability evaluation and for designing the operation 
strategy of medical DNNs.
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